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| Bust of Aristotle. Isn't he great? That beard... |
Well, this will be my first post regarding my project explicitly. I read and will be responding to two different articles. The first will be Myles Burnyeat's "De anima II 5." This article was first published in Phronesis, 47, 2002, p. 28-90. The second article is Rebecca Steiner Goldner's "Touch and Flesh in Aristotle's de Anima," published in Epoche: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, Spring, 2011, Vol.15(2), p.435-446. Lastly, Thomas K. Johansen's essay, "What's New in the De Sensu? The Place of the De Sensu in Aristotle's Psychology," found in Common to Body and Soul," edited by RAH King, published by Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2006, p. 140-164. Under each article heading, in text references will be given by page number, unless another author is indicated. Again, with those pleasantries out of the way, I begin.
Burnyeat
The longest article I read for this update. And it was a fascinating read. The main thrust of the article was two-fold: [1] the discussion of how to read an Aristotelian chapter, and [2] to figure out what the chapter is teaching on Aristotle's theory of perception (28). So, I will work through both of those aims, and then I will give any additional thoughts I might have on how this might contribute to my thesis.
[1] Regarding the first aim, the article was illuminating for someone not terribly versed in Aristotelian logic and argumentation. Burnyeat moves through Aristotle's outlining process, illuminating where, how, and why Aristotle develops his argument. The Aristotelian chapter begins by setting out the endoxa (reputable opinions) either to be defended, critiqued, or reworked (32). In giving the endoxa, Aristotle provides a sort of historical overview or introduction to the issue at hand, so it is usually also through the endoxa that the problem is implicitly seen. Burnyeat details and parses Aristotle rather exactingly but in an illuminating fashion, clearly showing what is at stake in de Anima II 5 -- what is perception and its relationship to alteration.
Moving from the endoxa, Aristotle next sets out to develop the aporia, the question or problem itself (37). To quote from Aristotle:
Further, it is for them to maintain, on the one hand, that like is unaffected by like and, on the other, that like perceives like and knows like by virtue of being like it, while at the same time they suppose that perceiving is some sort o ring affected and changed, and so too is conceiving and knowing (410a 23-6).The aporia is there -- how can something both by affected and unaffected by like? Burnyeat then explores the aporia, raising it and delineating the consequences. But all along showing how Aristotle will have to treat this problem he has raised. And what a problem it is: will he have to concede that like does not change like, as some presocratics had done and advocate that change is illusion? Or will Aristotle claim that like does change like, and then somehow answer by what cause and how is that possible?
From the aporia, Aristotle moves into a 'preliminary lusis' (40). But this preliminary solution runs through a torturous route in the remaining of the chapter, making distinctions and creating several schema, but in the end, Aristotle has a potential reconciliation of the aporia. But this moves us into the second part of Burnyeat's article: what Aristotle is arguing.
[2] How is Aristotle to deal with the aporia? What is his lusis? In order to understand Aristotle's escaping of the aporia, his concepts of potentiality and actuality will be applied, although with the argument that "alteration really alters" (42). Granted these two things, a schema of a triple level is developed -- doubled both for potentiality and for actuality. But first, a quote:
It is not just that some external cause is needed for perception. Perceiving is being assimilated to it, e.g. being warmed or reddened, and the whole weight of Aristotelian physics stands behind the demand that the cause of this alteration be soothing actually warm or red (45).Seen here, Aristotle's psychology springs forth from his physics, as Burnyeat argues. This is interesting to note, since it shows the hylomorphic link in Aristotle that permeates his whole system. It will also be interesting to explore this connection more, because Aristotelian physics has been proven wrong by modern science, although Aristotelian psychology might not be. There are defenses to be made, but here is not that place.
I continue to map the distinctions that Burnyeat syllogizes. First there are two types of potentialities that will expand into three distinctions, but there is an analogous consequence on actuality, which Aristotle is reluctant on sharing (47). But Burnyeat outlines them as (A1) incomplete actuality and (A2) a complete or unqualified actuality (47). And since these are mapped unto the two types of potentiality discussed in 417a 22-8 and 417b 30-32, Burnyeat says that Aristotle makes the extraordinary request that we suppose there is no such thing as a complete or unqualified actuality.
To present the triple schema and then explain it, it will be to demonstrate it and then discuss (50-51):
- first potentiality (1P)
- second potentiality (2P) / first actuality (1A)
- second actuality (2A)
It is good to remind ourselves that all this is trying to explain the process of perception. And in the process of perception, we are dealing with two different process -- from (1) to (2) and from (2) to (3).
(1P) is the base. The potentiality in the potential-filled one by nature, e.g. a human being is a potential 'knower' by nature. Following this example (and Burnyeat, 53-57), (P2) and (1A) is process of learning through repeated exercise and intake, but one cannot be said to 'know' something until the transition to (2A) is made. The first transition is argued to be an alteration, but the second is in doubt, so one can conceive of the second being a perfecting or a preservation (55). Aristotle uses the phrase "an advance into itself and into actuality," (417b 6-7) in order to describe the kind of change it is. Being born as perceivers, we are already are at the second potentiality. And so, we must explore the difference between "using one's senses and using one's knowledge" (57).
The difference lies in the basic understanding of perception as a passive ability and that of using one's knowledge as an act of will. But there are caveats and differences to be explored. Alteration in knowledge is not the same as it is in perception (60). And there is a further refinement, because Aristotle seems caught in calling teaching and the learning an alteration, a change. But as Burnyeat argues, it should be seen more of a development of the nature of the human being to learn, since the potentiality is basic.
Because this post is getting to be way too long, some final thoughts on Burnyeat. His argumentation is well-developed, synthetic, and beyond me at the moment. I left out the strict commentary I had doing for the last thirty pages of his article. In trying to articulate the nuances, I realize that I need to reread and reread it. And take another look at the de Anima. But I will get around to that. One of the last thoughts, though, that I really want to dwell on is still the notion the sense-object changes the perceiver. This was already present, but Burnyeat really goes into it in the final sections. Anyways, for me it is interesting in looking at touch, because when are we not touching? If perception changes the perceiver, are we being constantly changed, formed, by the world around us, via our touching? Also, in touching, since we are exposed to the world and the world changes us, does this not place the primacy on the external and not internal processes? Does this combat solipsistic tendencies in modern philosophy? These are some of the questions.
Goldner
After that LONG overview of Burnyeat's article, Goldner's and Johansen's pieces will seem to fly by. So without further delay, Touch and Flesh.
Goldner summarizes Aristotle's account, starting with his claim that the refrained sense of touch in human being may be the reason why the human is the most intelligent of all the animals (421a20, Goldner 436). Next she outlines the problematized components of touch: [1] multiple objects of touch (436), [2] the medium of the sense (437), and [3] the sense-organ proper (437). Each of these three components is present in the other senses with much ambiguity, but regarding the sense of touch each seems aporetic on its own.
[1] There is no object par excellence of touch. Aristotle lists the contraries of touch -- hot/cold, dry/moist, hard/soft (422b26) -- but he never concludes on an object, admitting "it is not clear what the one thing is that underlies touch in the way that sound underlies hearing" (422b35). Then there is [2] the medium of the sense, which for touch Aristotle argues it is flesh. Unlike the other sense, flesh being the medium for the sense makes the sense temporally and physical immediate (437). What Goldner does not raise is Aristotle's hypothesis that there is always air or water always between two objects, but the argument even in Aristotle's voice is half-hearted, given the experience of the immediacy. Finally, there is [3] sense-organ. The flesh again! Unfortunately, this breaks up the analogous relationships between the other senses each having their "organ-medium-object" schema (437).
The aporia could be addressed if the medium of air or water were adopted, but then a distinction would needed to be made between touch and contact (438). Goldner does argues that in the Physics, Aristotle addresses more contact than the sense of touch, but that touch too may never be immediate. In fact, she argues that touch may be the most mediated of the senses (439) having a double medium -- air/water and the flesh. But this leaves the main argument of the article -- "that touch is a masked grounding for a kind of knowledge implicit to the ensouled body" (439). Moreover, flesh in a living body is the extremity and "the inauguration of a whole new form of being" (439).The aporia is the immediacy and the distance in touch, a doubling, which "is not merely anoretic because it is difficult for us to understand, but also on account of a willful obscuring of its own nature" (440).
Goldner then works into the conversation several other thinkers: Jacques Derrida, Jean-Louis Chrétien, and M. Merleau-Ponty. The argument is essential that I am a body in the world, touching the world and exposed, and because of this I am alive and have knowledge through the very fact that I am a body. Merleau-Ponty's argument regarding the 'habit-body' and what I call muscle memory are brought to the fore, and the article concludes that touch "provides for us a primitive and tacit comprehension of the world" (442). Has touch opened for us a new metaphor? How can we step into it?
A brief foray into my own thought. If we do accept Goldner's argument that the sense of touch evidences a new form of cognition, then this is an opening to pursue a new metaphor of understanding that based and grounded in the tactile overcomes the problems presented in the visual and auditory metaphors, viz. the solipsistic and the self-denying. I've only ever explored this briefly, but to me it represents a realm worth exploring, a way through the aporia that traditional and radicalized phenomenology present to us. A new way of conceiving human experience. Anyways, just my thoughts.
Johansen
Lastly, there is Johansen's article. In it, he is delineating the difference between the project of the De Sensu et sensibilia and the De Anima. Unfortunately, like Burnyeat, Johansen never touches on touch explicitly, but the closest he comes he talking about perception and more strikingly thinking taking place in the body as an activity of the soul -- only being able to take place because of the body (147-8). His article is not crucial to my project, but it was helpful in several ways.
Firstly, the delineation of the different projects in Aristotle was very useful for my understanding. He argues that in the de Anima Aristotle is discussing explicitly the sense-organs and their constitution as an attempt to understand the structure of the soul, while in the de Sensu, Aristotle is done addressing those topics (in fact, he presupposes that the reader is familiar with the de Anima) but is instead speaking on sense-objects and the living encounters with them. There are several other arguments in the work, exploring more differences between the two books, but in essence, the article has been summarized. And this is already a long blog post!
Going From Here
Briefly, and then I am done. From here, there are more articles to read. I will be going through Johansen's book, Aristotle on the Sense-Organs, which is a detailed account of each sense-organ in the de Anima. I will probably just do on overview on his chapter on taste and touch, so that is something to look forward to. Anyways, as I learn more, this will become more of my own thoughts, instead of all the summarizations. Anyways, if you are still reading, GOD BLESS YOU AND YOUR CHILDREN. And if you have just skipped to the end, it's all good. I did too...
Later days!
(1P) is the base. The potentiality in the potential-filled one by nature, e.g. a human being is a potential 'knower' by nature. Following this example (and Burnyeat, 53-57), (P2) and (1A) is process of learning through repeated exercise and intake, but one cannot be said to 'know' something until the transition to (2A) is made. The first transition is argued to be an alteration, but the second is in doubt, so one can conceive of the second being a perfecting or a preservation (55). Aristotle uses the phrase "an advance into itself and into actuality," (417b 6-7) in order to describe the kind of change it is. Being born as perceivers, we are already are at the second potentiality. And so, we must explore the difference between "using one's senses and using one's knowledge" (57).
The difference lies in the basic understanding of perception as a passive ability and that of using one's knowledge as an act of will. But there are caveats and differences to be explored. Alteration in knowledge is not the same as it is in perception (60). And there is a further refinement, because Aristotle seems caught in calling teaching and the learning an alteration, a change. But as Burnyeat argues, it should be seen more of a development of the nature of the human being to learn, since the potentiality is basic.
Because this post is getting to be way too long, some final thoughts on Burnyeat. His argumentation is well-developed, synthetic, and beyond me at the moment. I left out the strict commentary I had doing for the last thirty pages of his article. In trying to articulate the nuances, I realize that I need to reread and reread it. And take another look at the de Anima. But I will get around to that. One of the last thoughts, though, that I really want to dwell on is still the notion the sense-object changes the perceiver. This was already present, but Burnyeat really goes into it in the final sections. Anyways, for me it is interesting in looking at touch, because when are we not touching? If perception changes the perceiver, are we being constantly changed, formed, by the world around us, via our touching? Also, in touching, since we are exposed to the world and the world changes us, does this not place the primacy on the external and not internal processes? Does this combat solipsistic tendencies in modern philosophy? These are some of the questions.
Goldner
After that LONG overview of Burnyeat's article, Goldner's and Johansen's pieces will seem to fly by. So without further delay, Touch and Flesh.
I will argue that by privileging tact over the other senses in his account of the soul, Aristotle suggests a mode of cognition that is neither modeled nor dependent on vision, but is instead attributable to the animate, sensate body in and of itself (435).In the long history of philosophy, sight has always had the privilege of the metaphor most often used to describe knowledge and cognition. Not until Emmanuel Levinas in the 20th century do we encounter another metaphor as strongly advocated, but Levinas's chosen metaphor was an auditory one. What Goldner is suggesting, and what she will argue is that there is a forgotten cognitive account in Aristotle, and what I will argue is that this account opens up or discloses another metaphor for us: that of the tactile.
Goldner summarizes Aristotle's account, starting with his claim that the refrained sense of touch in human being may be the reason why the human is the most intelligent of all the animals (421a20, Goldner 436). Next she outlines the problematized components of touch: [1] multiple objects of touch (436), [2] the medium of the sense (437), and [3] the sense-organ proper (437). Each of these three components is present in the other senses with much ambiguity, but regarding the sense of touch each seems aporetic on its own.
[1] There is no object par excellence of touch. Aristotle lists the contraries of touch -- hot/cold, dry/moist, hard/soft (422b26) -- but he never concludes on an object, admitting "it is not clear what the one thing is that underlies touch in the way that sound underlies hearing" (422b35). Then there is [2] the medium of the sense, which for touch Aristotle argues it is flesh. Unlike the other sense, flesh being the medium for the sense makes the sense temporally and physical immediate (437). What Goldner does not raise is Aristotle's hypothesis that there is always air or water always between two objects, but the argument even in Aristotle's voice is half-hearted, given the experience of the immediacy. Finally, there is [3] sense-organ. The flesh again! Unfortunately, this breaks up the analogous relationships between the other senses each having their "organ-medium-object" schema (437).
The aporia could be addressed if the medium of air or water were adopted, but then a distinction would needed to be made between touch and contact (438). Goldner does argues that in the Physics, Aristotle addresses more contact than the sense of touch, but that touch too may never be immediate. In fact, she argues that touch may be the most mediated of the senses (439) having a double medium -- air/water and the flesh. But this leaves the main argument of the article -- "that touch is a masked grounding for a kind of knowledge implicit to the ensouled body" (439). Moreover, flesh in a living body is the extremity and "the inauguration of a whole new form of being" (439).The aporia is the immediacy and the distance in touch, a doubling, which "is not merely anoretic because it is difficult for us to understand, but also on account of a willful obscuring of its own nature" (440).
Goldner then works into the conversation several other thinkers: Jacques Derrida, Jean-Louis Chrétien, and M. Merleau-Ponty. The argument is essential that I am a body in the world, touching the world and exposed, and because of this I am alive and have knowledge through the very fact that I am a body. Merleau-Ponty's argument regarding the 'habit-body' and what I call muscle memory are brought to the fore, and the article concludes that touch "provides for us a primitive and tacit comprehension of the world" (442). Has touch opened for us a new metaphor? How can we step into it?
A brief foray into my own thought. If we do accept Goldner's argument that the sense of touch evidences a new form of cognition, then this is an opening to pursue a new metaphor of understanding that based and grounded in the tactile overcomes the problems presented in the visual and auditory metaphors, viz. the solipsistic and the self-denying. I've only ever explored this briefly, but to me it represents a realm worth exploring, a way through the aporia that traditional and radicalized phenomenology present to us. A new way of conceiving human experience. Anyways, just my thoughts.
Johansen
Lastly, there is Johansen's article. In it, he is delineating the difference between the project of the De Sensu et sensibilia and the De Anima. Unfortunately, like Burnyeat, Johansen never touches on touch explicitly, but the closest he comes he talking about perception and more strikingly thinking taking place in the body as an activity of the soul -- only being able to take place because of the body (147-8). His article is not crucial to my project, but it was helpful in several ways.
Firstly, the delineation of the different projects in Aristotle was very useful for my understanding. He argues that in the de Anima Aristotle is discussing explicitly the sense-organs and their constitution as an attempt to understand the structure of the soul, while in the de Sensu, Aristotle is done addressing those topics (in fact, he presupposes that the reader is familiar with the de Anima) but is instead speaking on sense-objects and the living encounters with them. There are several other arguments in the work, exploring more differences between the two books, but in essence, the article has been summarized. And this is already a long blog post!
Going From Here
Briefly, and then I am done. From here, there are more articles to read. I will be going through Johansen's book, Aristotle on the Sense-Organs, which is a detailed account of each sense-organ in the de Anima. I will probably just do on overview on his chapter on taste and touch, so that is something to look forward to. Anyways, as I learn more, this will become more of my own thoughts, instead of all the summarizations. Anyways, if you are still reading, GOD BLESS YOU AND YOUR CHILDREN. And if you have just skipped to the end, it's all good. I did too...
Later days!
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